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TWO VISIONS OF CONTRACT
Hanoch Dagan*
JUSTICE IN TRANSACTIONS: A THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW. By Peter
Benson. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press. 2019. Pp. xii, 610. $85.
INTRODUCTION
Contract is one of the most fundamental legal concepts and one of the
basic building blocks of our social and economic life. Contract theory must
therefore be attentive both to the defining features of contract as a legal construct and to the conceptions of the person and of our interpersonal relationships on which they rely. In his ambitious book, Justice in Transactions: A
Theory of Contract Law, Peter Benson 1 offers such an account of contract.
Justice in Transactions carefully examines a variety of contract doctrines
from formation to enforcement and defends a normative vision of the parties and their relation. Benson is one of the most thoughtful, sophisticated,
and provocative contract theorists of our time, and Justice in Transactions is
likely to become the definite modern statement of the venerable transfer
theory of contract.
Benson’s thesis is that contract is “a form of transactional acquisition—a
transfer of ownership between the parties—that is contractually specified
and complete at contract formation” (p. 41). Formation of contract in this
vision is a “representational medium of mutual promises,” through which
each party moves “a substantive content” from her “rightful exclusive control” to the other’s (p. 321). This means that the performance of a contract is
of no normative significance: it merely delivers to the promisee’s factual possession what was rightfully hers (pp. 24, 358–59). Accordingly, it implies that
breach of contract is tantamount (or at least analogous) to conversion
(p. 247).
Transfer theory figures in some prominent philosophical accounts of
contract, notably Kant’s and Hegel’s. 2 But Benson’s account does not rely on
“any particular philosophical framework” (p. 476). Rather, it is offered as “a

* Stewart and Judy Colton Professor of Legal Theory and Innovation and Director of
the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Tel-Aviv University. Thanks to Itzik Benbaji, Peter Benson, Roy Kreitner, and Benjamin Lempert for their important comments.
1. Professor of Law, University of Toronto.
2 . See generally Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive
Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1077
(1989); Helge Dedek, A Particle of Freedom: Natural Law Thought and the Kantian Theory of
Transfer by Contract, 25 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 313 (2012).
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public justification,” which is based on “notions implicit in the public legal
culture and the private law of a liberal society” (p. 27). Contract theory, in
this view, must present “a coherent and morally acceptable account of contract law” that draws on plausible interpretations of its main doctrines and
expresses “normative ideas and ideals,” which are more or less intuitive “to
general educated common sense.” 3
A theory of contract, Benson insists, must be morally acceptable because
contract law “always involve[s] coercible correlative rights and duties of performance” (p. 13). Transfer theory ensures contract’s legitimacy since it relies on a conception of the parties “solely as individual private owners” who
respect each other’s independence and thus instantiates in law a conception
of justice in transactions that is “indifferent to the satisfaction of substantive
needs and purposes” (pp. 26, 396).
Justice in Transactions is a long book, which offers many insights and
explores a series of major debates in law and legal theory, and I cannot possibly cover them all in this short Review. I focus on Benson’s conceptualization and normative defense of contract as a transfer of ownership. In order
to both appreciate the significant contribution of Justice in Transactions to
contract theory and explain what are in my view its critical deficiencies, I will
contrast Benson’s account with a competing understanding of contract,
which I have developed with Michael Heller in recent years. 4 Contract, in my
view, is a plan coauthored by the parties in the service of their respective
goals; contract law is guided by an autonomy-enhancing telos; law’s justification for enforcing contracts is premised on the liberal commitment to reciprocal respect for self-determination (rather than independence).
This comparison helps to refine three lines of critique of transfer theory.
Transfer theory, I will argue, misrepresents law’s facilitation of contract as an
exercise of implication; it marginalizes contract law’s robust commitment to
relational justice; and it understates the way law’s regard to the parties’ future selves limits the range of enforceable commitments people can undertake. These pitfalls are manifestations of a deeper difficulty of transfer
theory. It relies on an overly restrictive justificatory premise, which leads it
to obscure the full implications of contract’s intertemporal dimension.

3. P. 14. Benson argues that a public justification must “emerge from a concrete and
detailed analysis of the specific doctrines.” P. 20. But there is no straightforward way to analyze
these doctrines at face value, as this proposition implies, because any exercise of legal interpretation necessarily involves marginalization and demarginalization of various doctrinal features.
See Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Against Private Law Escapism: Comment on Arthur
Ripstein, Private Wrongs, 14 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 37, 39–45 (2016).
4 . See HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS
(2017); Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, Choice Theory: A Restatement, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE LAW THEORY 112 (Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin Zipursky eds., 2020).
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THE CHALLENGE

Before I can delve into the two visions of contract I wish to compare and
their main differences, it is important to clarify the challenge contract theory
must face. Benson’s analysis provides a perfect starting point for appreciating law’s justificatory burden both in what it convincingly establishes and in
what is, I will claim, an unnecessary, and indeed undesirable, excess on
which he insists.
As Benson claims early on, because “contractual obligation is always coercively enforceable obligation,” its legitimacy requires that it can be “shown
to be consistent with the freedom and equality of the parties” (pp. 1–2). This
statement correctly implies that reference to the benefits of the practice of
contract to society at large, such as its contribution to aggregate welfare,
cannot suffice. What is needed in order to properly justify contract law is a
justification that is attuned to contract’s bilateral nature, one that justifies the
promisor’s coercible obligation to the promisee. 5
To see why such a justification is not trivial, Benson invokes the “question that [Lon] Fuller and [William] Perdue made central for modern contract theory but that, despite the passage of more than eighty years [from the
publication of their seminal contribution], 6 has yet to receive a fully satisfactory answer” (p. 361). The problem, as he notes, arises from “the difference
in time” between promise and performance (p. 361); it focuses, in other
words, on the enforcement of wholly executory contracts.
Fuller and Perdue’s specific doctrinal question is why contract law goes
beyond promisors’ reliance interest and vindicates their expectation interest
(pp. 5–7). This seemingly technical detail raises a series of normative queries:
Why is contract law willing to coercively enforce promises even when nonperformance generates no detrimental harm? What can legitimize, in these
circumstances, law’s disrespect of the updated preference of a promisor who
has changed her mind? And how can this be justified even where the promisor has not deliberately intended to be so bound? (pp. 12, 16–17, 19, 469).
Benson rightly claims that law in a liberal polity must be able to justify to
a promisor why it authorizes the promisee to insist that the promisor does
not renege on the promise even in such circumstances, and why it is furthermore willing to coercively enforce the promise in case she nonetheless
fails to perform. He is thus also correct that a liberal theory of contract must
not be contented with answers that rely either on the public benefits that
vindicating promisees’ expectations may generate or on the virtues that
moralists attribute to promise keeping. 7

5 . See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
14 (2d ed. 2015) (1981).
6 . See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages
(pts. 1 & 2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936–1937).
7. Because liberalism takes seriously the distinction between persons, liberal law requires that defendants should be entitled to a justification that goes beyond reference to the
desirability of the state of affairs that would result if the plaintiff’s complaint were to generate
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Benson, however, goes further than that. For him, a proper justification
must fit private law’s “organizing idea of liability for misfeasance” only, in
which “a party is subject to liability only insofar as he or she may reasonably
be viewed as injuring or interfering with another’s ownership or rightful exclusive possession of something” (pp. 367, 377). This framework imposes
only negative prohibitions; that is, duties of noninterference, rather than
positive duties to assist (p. 377). It thus vindicates the parties’ interpersonal
independence by rendering their respective needs, desires, circumstances,
interests, and wellbeing, as well as purposes and motives, legally irrelevant
(p. 378). The parties must “respect each other as mutually exclusive private
owners”; but they need not “justify their conduct in light of these or any other substantive ends” (pp. 27, 367–69, 371–72, 377–78).
In that, transfer theory expresses a conception that Benson terms “juridical autonomy,” which “presupposes particular notions of freedom and
equality specified in terms of the innate mutual independence of all persons
in relation to others” (pp. 373, 468–69). This conception emphatically excludes any reference to the parties’ self-determination; namely, their “forming and rationally pursuing a conception of their substantive good” (p. 469).
It likewise rejects any consideration of substantive equality, subscribing instead to formal equality in which “the claims parties make in relation to each
other must be absolutely the same” (p. 373). As we will see, this conception
of our juridical interpersonal life shapes transfer theory; it also explains
much of my disagreement with Benson.
II.

TRANSFER OR PLAN

Transfer theory, Benson writes, follows the footsteps of contract’s legacy
at common law, where “historically, recognition of the executory contract . . . was the culmination of a long development that began centuries earlier with . . . the immediately executed barter or exchange” (p. 334). Whereas
barter resulted in a transfer of ownership, “according to the earliest law, prior to payment of the price or to delivery, the parties might withdraw without
penalty—all the legal effects occurring only with the actual performance”
(p. 334). Benson rightly observes, however, that “the true juridical ground,”
and thus the ultimate mechanism that effectuated barters, was “the direct relation of will to will” that constitutes “the parties’ mutual recognition”
(p. 338). This means that “[t]he crucial conceptual move from immediate exchange to contract is the explicit (and therefore doctrinal) positing of a normative-temporal difference between agreement and performance” (p. 338).
This conceptual move becomes possible, however, once we recognize that

the remedy sought. See HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM &
RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW THEORY 11, 106 (2013). This means that private law should be able
to justify to a defendant why she should be forced to be the agent of remedying the plaintiff’s
predicament as well as why the defendant is entitled to the prescribed remedy. See id . at 110.
The former prong points to the insufficiency of utilitarian arguments; the latter suggests that
virtue ethical justifications are likewise inadequate.
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the parties’ representations establish “the moment of the transfer of present
exclusive control over a determinate object” (p. 339), so that “the whole of
the juridical force and effect of the transaction [is] lodged in the moment of
mutual assents alone,” and performance is a mere consequence (p. 338).
Benson’s conceptualization of contract formation, performance, breach, and
remedies nicely complies with this model of contract as an extension of barter.
Thus, “the parties’ mutually related promises” at the moment of formation “function as representations, which, insofar as they can be reasonably
viewed as manifesting present complete decisions to move something of value from the exclusive control of one party into that of the other party, are
attributed a juridical meaning in terms of ownership and a transfer of ownership.” 8 This means that formation is not a “joint undertaking” of a “cooperative arrangement[]”; rather, formation is a “reciprocal exchange” (p. 470),
which “enshrines the basic normative independence of each party vis-à-vis
the other insofar as each obtains rightful exclusive control against the other
with respect to the substance of the consideration” (p. 352).
Since the promisee’s “right to be put into possession of the promised
thing or its value[] is fixed and crystallized” at formation, performance is “the
contractually stipulated necessary mode of the promisor not injuring the
promisee’s already complete entitlements” (p. 352). Therefore, Benson rejects the term the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (following Fuller and
Perdue) uses for the promisee’s rightful interest against the promisor: transfer theory implies that rather than an expectation interest, 9 the promisee’s
“absolute and unconditional” entitlement is properly called the “performance interest” (pp. 264, 341, 352–53). Correspondingly, Benson conceptualizes the parties’ actual performance as “taking possession via delivery”
(p. 359). Performance, in this view, “does not add to or in any way change
the rightful acquisition,” which as between the parties is completely “effectuated at formation” (p. 64). Rather, performance only changes “the locus of
rightful physical possession from promisor to promisee.” 10
Thus, the promisor’s failure to perform must be understood “as an interference with the plaintiff’s exclusive right to an asset—the substance of the
consideration—that has already been moved to her at formation” (p. 251),
which implies a “striking parallel” between breach of contract and conversion (p. 247). Indeed, once formation is “viewed as a form of transactional
acquisition and transfer of rightful control as between the parties” (p. 251),
any withholding of the promised performance is a failure to deliver what already belongs to another. Breach is “a per se wrongful deprivation and injury” (p. 251), because “[b]y failing to deliver, the promisor must necessarily be

8. P. 393; see also p. 68.
9 . See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
10. P. 359. This is because performance provides public notice, which is necessary in
order to make “the rights-establishing power of the contract . . . operative vis-à-vis third parties.” P. 359.
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viewed vis-à-vis the promisee as wrongfully exercising factual control over
the promised subject matter against the promisee’s right to have or enjoy it”
(p. 252); a breaching promisor “deprives” the promisee of the “promised
performance that [he] has vested with her, as a matter of rights, at contract
formation” (p. 247).
Finally, if breach is tantamount to conversion, contract remedies must
not be understood either as “the contingent product of the parties’ individual
or joint decisions” (p. 262) or as “implied contractual terms” (p. 261). There
is, in this view, a “legally categorical difference between terms and remedies”
(p. 313). Remedies “represent a second and distinct step that is completely
ancillary and subordinate to and that aims to vindicate the plaintiff’s performance interest” (p. 261). They are “the law’s coercive response to the civil
wrong of breach,” namely, to the promisor’s interference with what “rightfully belongs to [the promisee] exclusively” (p. 255). Thus conceived, contractual remedies embody “the organizing principle of liability for
misfeasance only”: the promisor is liable “for violating a negative prohibition
against interference and injury, not a positive duty to preserve, assist, or enhance” (p. 255).
Indeed, transfer theory’s conceptualization of contract formation, performance, breach, and remedies brilliantly dissolves contract law’s justificatory challenge as Benson understands it. Formation amounts to complete
juridical acquisition of exclusive rights “prior to and independent from actual performance and irrespective of whether either party detrimentally relies
on the other’s promise” (p. 8). Thus, although factually “breach ordinarily
consists in a defendant’s pure omission, its normative significance is not that
it is a failure to confer a benefit but rather a wrongful injury” (p. 368) that
interferes with what is already under the promisee’s “rightful exclusive control” (p. 393). Therefore, even though “the duty to perform is expressed in
positive form,” it “should properly be viewed as based on a negative prohibition: do not injure or interfere with what comes under another’s rights”
(p. 66). Thus, misleading appearances notwithstanding, contract law applies
its coercive power only “defensively, healing a disturbed status quo” (p. 8); it
annuls the “appearance of interpersonal validity attaching to the defendant’s
violation” (p. 259) of “the plaintiff’s right to exclude” (p. 257). Contract law,
again notwithstanding misleading appearances, “is fully consistent with the
independence of personality”: it only requires the parties to respect each other’s “exclusive and independent juridical self” (p. 385); and it thus “respects
them as free and equal persons with the moral power to be unconditionally
independent in the face of everything given” (pp. 393–94).
*

*

*

If juridical autonomy, which strictly upholds the parties’ interpersonal
independence, is the sine qua non to the legitimacy of contract law as transfer theory assumes, Benson’s model of contract as an extension of barter may
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be the best we can do. 11 But, Benson’s skepticism notwithstanding, the competing view of contract as a joint undertaking of a cooperative arrangement
actually fits “general educated common sense” (p. 14). Thinking about contract in these terms implies that formation is not the only normatively relevant moment in the life of contract, as it is in transfer theory. It thus requires
reinstating the full significance of contract’s intertemporal dimension. Focusing along these lines on the times of contract, suppressed by transfer theory, this competing account of contract brings to light the core achievement
of contract, which transfer theory fails to capture, while complying with contract law’s justificatory burden, properly refined.
Historically, contract might have emerged from barter. 12 But contract’s
vocation need not be dependent on its path. The shift from validating barters
to enforcing contract indeed extends the range of exchanges people can
make, but it does much more than that. Contract is the means through
which we can legitimately enlist others to our own goals, purposes, and projects—both material and social. 13 By ensuring the reliability of contractual
promises for future performance, contract law enables people to join forces
in their respective plans into the future. An enforceable agreement is the parties’ script for this cooperative endeavor, and contract law provides them, as
we will see, with the indispensable infrastructure that both facilitates this
risky venture and ensures its integrity.
Contract is, as Charles Fried argued, “a kind of moral invention” exactly
because it extends people’s reach in this way. 14 By expanding the available
repertoire of secure interpersonal planning engagements beyond the realm
of close-knit interactions, contract law dramatically augments people’s ability to plan. In that it makes a crucial contribution to their autonomy because
self-determination involves planning. People, to be sure, may change their
plans, and autonomous persons must be entitled to do so. But having a set of
plans arranged in a temporal sequence is typically key to the ability to carry
out higher-order projects; namely, to self-determine. 15
11. The language of the text is intentionally cautious. Benson relies, as we have seen, on
a view of ownership as “rightful exclusive control over something,” p. 383, which is, as I argue
elsewhere, very different from the genuinely liberal conception of ownership and is furthermore indefensible. See HANOCH DAGAN, A LIBERAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 1–9, 41–147 (2020).
This pitfall of Benson’s account, shared by other versions of transfer theory, leads to further
conceptual and normative difficulties. See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 4, at 39–40; Hanoch
Dagan & Michael Heller, Autonomy for Contract, Refined, 39 LAW & PHIL. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 11–15) (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
12. The qualified language of the text is intentional. See Roy Kreitner, Toward a Political
Economy of Money, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND LAW 7, 10 n.9
(Ugo Mattei & John D. Haskell eds., 2015).
13 . See FRIED, supra note 5, at 8.
14. Charles Fried, The Ambitions of Contract as Promise, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CONTRACT LAW 17, 20 (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., 2014).
15 . Cf . Charles R. Beitz, Property and Time, 26 J. POL. PHIL. 419, 427 (2018) (explaining
the significance of security of possession in property in reference to the intertemporal nature of
self-determination).
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This autonomy-enhancing function of contract depends, as noted, on
the reliability of contractual promises, which explains why a contractual
right is the right to expect; that is, why contract law does not merely protect
promisees’ actual reliance. To perform its core mission of ensuring the reliability of wholly executory contracts, contract needs to recruit law’s coercive
power against promisors even before promisees have actually been harmed. 16
Moreover, because contract’s empowerment potential depends on people’s
ability to count on the representations of others, an autonomy-enhancing
view of contract implies that individuals may be required to satisfy promisees’ expectations even if they only inadvertently invoked the convention of
contract with no subjective intention to be legally obligated. 17
As noted, for Benson these last observations are the source of contract’s
legitimacy crisis. Elsewhere I explain in some detail why they need not be. 18
Contract law, and private law more generally, can be legitimate even if law
rejects the overly demanding criterion of strict adherence to interpersonal
independence as long as it takes seriously the more fundamental requirement of interpersonal justification. Private law in general and contract law
more particularly are premised on reciprocal respect for self-determination,
not independence. 19 This implies that while there are good reasons to resist
excessive interference with people’s autonomy that many affirmative interpersonal duties to aid others entail, there is no reason for the blanket rejection of affirmative duties that Benson’s notion of juridical autonomy
prescribes. As H.L.A. Hart explained, since some, but not all, infringements
of our independence ignore “the moral importance of the division of humanity into separate individuals and threaten the proper inviolability of persons,” we must always distinguish “between the gravity of the different
restrictions on different specific liberties and their importance for the conduct of a meaningful life.” 20 In a liberal polity, the distinction between duties
of right and duties of virtue need not, and does not, track the misfeasancenonfeasance distinction; duties of right are not only duties of abstention.
Thus, once we recognize that people are justifiably expected to pay some
modest price to benefit others with whom they engage or interact, we realize
that there is no way, and no reason, to bypass the modest interpersonal burden that law imposes on promisors who voluntarily invoke the contract convention while engaging with promisees. Promisees are justified in expecting
16 . See Hanoch Dagan, The Value of Choice and the Justice of Contract, 10
JURISPRUDENCE 422, 428–29 (2019).
17 . See Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
1603, 1620–25 (2009).
18. For contract law, see Dagan & Heller, supra note 11. For private law more generally,
see Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Justice in Private: Beyond the Rawlsian Framework, 37
LAW & PHIL. 171 (2018), and Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (2016) [hereinafter Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships].
19 . See Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships, supra note 18; DAGAN & HELLER, supra
note 4, at 41–47.
20. H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 828, 834–35 (1979).
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promisors to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of contract law notwithstanding the cautionary burden this may impose on them, because this is the
modest price each pays so the other can benefit from contract law’s potential
to advance our self-determination.
Rather than rehearsing the details of this argument, the remainder of
this Review contrasts these two competing views of contract at the back end
by comparatively examining their major ramifications. I divide this inquiry
into three sections, dealing respectively with the task of contract law, its
proper conception of justice, and the appropriate limit of its reach. The last
ramification, dealing with the limits of contract, also reframes the challenge
posed by the difference in time between promise and performance.
III. IMPLICATION OR FACILITATION
Adherence to interpersonal independence implies that contractual terms
can be coercively enforced only if they are either expressly spelled out by the
parties or implicit in their particular interaction. This stance may explain the
traditional reluctance of common law judges to enforce agreements that are
relatively thin in explicit terms. 21 But contemporary contract law takes a diametrically opposed attitude: it is typified by a robust apparatus of default
rules that the contracting parties can change, but which otherwise apply
whether or not the parties intended that they would. 22 Contemporary contract theory conceptualizes these rules in terms of filling gaps in incomplete
contracts. 23 Faithful to its commitment to interpersonal independence, however, Justice in Transactions repudiates, as it must, this view: “parties can be
bound,” Benson argues, “only by what they have done” (p. 132).
For transfer theory, default rules of contract law do not fill gaps, but are
rather implications of the parties’ particular “self-regulating” transaction
(p. 123). Objectively construed, “enforceable agreements are not contractually incomplete” (p. 23). Rather, they have “all the internal resources needed to
determine what can and should be implied” (p. 23). By spelling out “what is
reasonably required to make sense and to secure the full and fair value of the
terms actually agreed to” (p. 131), implication can “specify” the “ ‘secondary’
or ‘dependent’ terms and conditions” of a transaction, which “fill out, qualify, and further determine the performances owed as between the parties”
(p. 124). Implication must follow the presumed intent of the particular parties of the actual transaction. It “refers to what the parties to a given contract
must reasonably have intended because necessary” (p. 134) to prevent rendering their contract “futile, without value or benefit, or just manifestly ab-

21 . See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 120 (4th ed. 2004).
22 . See id . at 121.
23 . See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis
of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 261
(1985).
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surd” (p. 142). This test of “transactional necessity” ensures that implication
complies with the rigid requirements of interpersonal independence. 24
Implication can admittedly explain a subset of contemporary contract
law’s default rules apparatus. But it can hardly account for its breadth and
depth. If contract law had been guided by the rigid approach of juridical autonomy, it would have followed the old common law approach that, by refusing to enforce an agreement if the parties have not spelled out the main
terms of their interaction, reduced the divergence between their actual intent
and the rules that governed their agreements. Current law, however, is very
different. Both the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts go out of their way to proactively facilitate transactions by
offering defaults that can fill gaps, even regarding crucial aspects of a transaction, such as price. 25
This understanding of the function of law’s default rules as gap-fillers
clearly departs from transfer theory’s adherence to interpersonal independence. But it need not, and I think should not, subordinate people’s interpersonal interactions to the collective good. Rather, properly understood, the
raison d’être of modern contract law’s facilitative approach is to expand the
scope of people’s cooperative engagements that may be conducive to their
own future plans. A genuinely liberal view of contract must not be contented
with implication, because nothing short of proactive facilitation properly
complies with its underlying commitment to empower our selfdetermination. 26
Substituting implication of the terms of transfer with the facilitation of
joint undertakings of cooperative plans in the service of the parties’ selfdetermination properly accounts for the capacious fabric of defaults that can
hardly fit the straitjacket of transactional necessity. It also helps representing doctrines that may be squeezed into this framework but are better
understood as core features of liberal contract law. It furthermore offers a
critical perspective on still other doctrines that transfer theory valorizes but
that should actually be, if contract is to enhance our autonomy, reformed.
Let me give four examples for these effects of settling with implication, rather than facilitation, running along the spectrum from redundant explanations to apology.
A. Consequential Damages
Benson concedes the challenge consequential damages for breach pose
to transfer theory: as Robert Pothier noted, a consequential loss stands for
“the breach’s impact on the plaintiff’s independently chosen purposes and

24 .
25 .

See p. 133.
See U.C.C. §§ 2-204(3), 2-305 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
26 . See generally Hanoch Dagan, Types of Contracts and Law’s Autonomy-Enhancing
Role, 5 EUR. CONT. L. & THEORY (forthcoming 2020) (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
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uses” (p. 276), rather than for not obtaining the “performance interest in
possession” itself (p. 276), which is “the thing” that was supposed to be delivered (p. 277). Benson rescues the by now canonical rule of liability for consequential loss by invoking implication: a promisor should be liable for such
losses where the promisee can show that “the use of the promised subject
matter” was “reasonably and mutually contemplated by the parties’ mutual
assents at contract formation” (pp. 276–79). This is a convincing response to
Pothier. But from the perspective of an autonomy-enhancing conception of
contract it is one thought too many. Contract law is supposed to facilitate
parties’ efforts to mutually benefit each other’s future plans, and the contemplated uses of the parties’ respective performances are obviously the
point of their joint undertaking.
B. Contract Types
Transfer theory, as Benson claims, has no difficulty in respecting “the
shared understandings of parties in their social and economic roles in different transaction-types as these have developed and are continuing to develop
over time” (p. 433). Benson furthermore concedes that insofar as these contract types (as I call them) “become routinized and culturally familiar to
market participants,” contract law can validate their “principles, standards,
and rules,” and thus (as a happy side effect) provide “guidance of conduct in
other transactions yet to come” (pp. 432–34). This is surely true, but from an
autonomy-enhancing perspective such a reactive stance is quite disappointing.
As Heller and I argue in The Choice Theory of Contracts, a genuinely liberal contract law, which takes seriously the commitment to our selfdetermination, must ensure the availability of multiple contract types that
can provide people multiple off-the-shelf options for interpersonal interaction. 27 More specifically, contract law must, and to some (limited) extent already does, provide a sufficiently diverse repertoire of contract types for each
major contracting sphere—commerce, work, intimacy, and home—so as to
offer people meaningful choice for these important spheres of social activity
and interaction. 28 For contract types to be autonomy enhancing along these
lines, they need to be partial functional substitutes for each other: “They need
to be substitutes because choice is not enhanced with alternatives that are
orthogonal to each other; and their substitutability should not be too complete because types that are too similar also do not offer meaningful
choice.” 29 Choice theory congratulates contract law’s performance on this
front insofar as it relates to the commercial sphere (consider agency contracts, franchise contracts, partnership contracts and the like); and it offers
29F

27.
28 .
29 .

DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 4, at 102–09.
Id . at 102–05.
Id . at 97.
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some reforms as per the other spheres of contracting—work, intimacy, and
home. 30
C. Gratuitous Promises
Benson’s model of contract as an extension of barter implies that—just
as with barters—contracts can be formed only if “promise and consideration
are mutually joined as each given for the other” (p. 78). This is why contract
formation necessarily involves a “promise-for-consideration” (p. 47), and
gratuitous promises are “normatively distinct” (p. 400) from contractual
ones: the duties gratuitous promises give rise to are thus necessarily “purely
moral and noncoercible” (p. 401). Given such a qualitative and irreducible
difference, transfer theory embraces the common law’s traditional exclusion
of “bare” promises from contract law, “however seriously made [and] memorialized” they may be (p. 58). Benson, to be sure, recognizes the veteran
practice of the seal, which “can produce the very same contractual effects”
for a mere gratuitous promise (p. 437). But he insists that this need not affect
his account of contract per se, since here the seal functions as a powerconferring device, whose familiarity to the parties assures that its use is intended to produce such legal effects. 31
An autonomy-based theory of contract analyzes these issues quite differently. Contract in this view is understood, as noted, as an essentially powerconferring institution, with self-determination as its grounding principle. 32
This does not mean that it is unconcerned with the specter of inadvertent
invocation of contract. Ensuring the promisor’s full voluntariness—not only
regarding her interaction with the promisee but also with respect to its legal
consequences—is a challenge even for Benson’s scheme, which heavily relies
on implication (and, of course, on the objective theory). 33 But this concern
does not justify abdicating liberal law’s obligation to facilitate through contract our self-determination. Just as the seal may have partially solved this
worry, contract law can resort to other means to ameliorate—if not fully address—it, be they doctrines like duress and misrepresentation or other formal requirements, such as writing.
Therefore, Benson’s claim that once the significance of the seal “is no
longer generally understood in practice,” contract law should fall back to
“the baseline requirement of consideration” (p. 439) cannot be satisfactory.
A genuinely liberal contract law, which takes seriously its core mission of fa-

30 . See id . at 67–78, 93–124.
31 . See pp. 436–39.
32 . See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 4, at 37–47. Careful readers may observe that the
text highlights one of the most fundamental distinctions between transfer theory (at least as
Benson presents it), which perceives contract as a duty-imposing institution, and choice theory, which insists that it is essentially power-conferring. I have criticized the duty-imposing
view of contract, which typifies both transfer theory and T.M. Scanlon’s assurance theory,
elsewhere. See id . at 37–39; Dagan, supra note 16, at 426–29.
33 . See chapter 3; section 2.2.
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cilitating joint undertakings for cooperative engagements and furthermore
appreciates that there are many contexts in which this would not involve
new consideration, must proactively construct the means that would give effect to such endeavors. A simple solution was provided many years ago by
Samuel Williston, who drafted the Uniform Written Obligation Act (enacted
now only in Pennsylvania), which renders enforceable any written and
signed promise that contains an “express statement . . . that the signer intends to be legally bound.” 34
D. Liquidated Damages
Finally, Benson’s defense of the traditional doctrine governing liquidated damages nicely follows transfer theory’s understanding of breach as a
wrong. The parties’ intent cannot, under this view, confer upon them the
power to determine the compensation owing for breach, even where there is
no concern for the promisor’s vulnerability. The most the parties can do is to
indicate to the reviewing court their assessment of the performance interest.
The final word must be the court’s, whose task is to determine whether “the
quantum of the agreed damages sum [is] reasonably commensurate with
that interest” (p. 208). The fact that an enhanced measure is used, for example, in order to reinforce the promisor’s incentive to perform is of no moment even where it “serves both parties’ ex ante rational interests” (pp. 207–
09, 212–13).
But once we no longer limit contract to cases of extended barter, this
analysis collapses. There is no reason to categorically deprive the parties
from the power to determine contract remedies. Quite the contrary: their
plans should, as they typically do, cover the eventuality of breach as well; and
if they can ex ante devise together a mutually satisfying formula for this contingency, a facilitative law should not hesitate to follow suit. Ex post fairness
review may well be appropriate in contract types in which promisors are
vulnerable to making suboptimal choices. But where sophisticated parties to
complex commercial contracts use a liquidated-damages clause in anticipation of possibly unverifiable harms of breach (or for any other reason that
fits their cooperative engagement), an autonomy-enhancing contract law
must validate its full effect. 35
IV. FAIRNESS OR RELATIONAL JUSTICE
Transfer theory’s commitment to reciprocal respect for independence
and its notion of implication undergird its conception of contractual fairness. In transfer, the parties express their formal equality as owners. Therefore, Benson explains, the law can, indeed must, impute to them a
presumption “to transact for equal value” (p. 174). Like other exercises of
34 . See ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 143 (5th ed.
2013) (quoting 33 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6 (West 1997)).
35 . See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 4, at 94.
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implication, this presumption, which typically utilizes as its measure the
“competitive market price [that] is ordinarily fair to all transactors” (p. 184),
belongs to “the principles of contract formation” (p. 168), which is the normatively significant moment for transfer theory. As such, this presumption
is not conclusive: “[I]n light of the parties’ power to assert their independence, it cannot be either obligatory or required for persons to transact only
for equal value” (p. 388). Unequal exchanges are thus perfectly justified
where they are “consistent with the parties’ abstract equality,” namely, where
a party, who knows or has access to the going market price, manifests either
“donative intent or assumption of risk” (pp. 387–88).
Indeed, transfer theory’s principle of equal value is “purely transactional” (p. 174). It is clearly nondistributive: its “exclusive focus on given transactions viewed separately and not as part of the more comprehensive social
system makes it unsuitable as a principle of distributive justice” (p. 188–190).
But Benson insists that contractual fairness’s indifference to the parties’ predicament goes much further than that. Contractual fairness must strictly adhere to “the standpoint of juridical personality” (p. 388). This means, for
example, that there is no transactional unfairness where “the terms obtained
by a financially disadvantaged party who poses a credit risk [are] harsher
than those available to one who is wealthier” (p. 186). More generally, in
transfer theory’s conception of contractual fairness “[i]nexperience, infirmity, ignorance, emotional vulnerability, and so forth are relevant only if, and
insofar as, they result in unequal terms and preclude an inference of donative intent or assumption of risk” (p. 189). Contractual fairness for Benson
“does not aim to redress differences in bargaining power per se or unfair and
unequal starting points, nor does it ensure the satisfaction of needs, however
urgent” (p. 388). It has no business in protecting particular categories of individuals, be they “the economically or cognitively disadvantaged, the commercially inexperienced or the emotionally vulnerable” (p. 188).
A viable conception of justice for contract must, I think, go further than
that. Substituting reciprocal respect for independence with reciprocal respect
for self-determination as contract’s normative infrastructure implies that
whereas distributive justice is indeed not in place, transfer theory’s exclusion
of any freestanding reference to the parties’ predicament is unacceptable.
Furthermore, because transfer theory focuses solely on formation, it is blind
to the interpersonal vulnerability that typifies ongoing joint endeavors like
contracts. This vulnerability adds an additional layer of contractual justice,
whose significance is further fortified once its potential detrimental effects
on contract’s ability to perform its autonomy-enhancing function is properly
appreciated.
Allowing the enforcement of contracts to rely on the most fundamental
commitment of a liberal private law to reciprocal respect for selfdetermination, which includes modest affirmative interpersonal obligations,
suggests a corresponding conception of contractual justice. Avihay Dorfman
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and I call this relational justice. 36 Contemporary contract law follows suits
with a wide array of doctrinal rules that robustly vindicate contract law’s
compliance with this prescription of reciprocal respect for selfdetermination. Some of these rules are products of adjudication; others were
enacted by legislatures and regulatory agencies, oftentimes after the common
law set a vague standard that legislators and regulators are better suited to
delimit. 37
Many of these rules set a “floor” for enforceable agreements. 38 If contract
law’s legitimacy relies, as I claim it does, on our reciprocal respect for selfdetermination, then violations of this maxim must be treated (at least prima
facie) as ultra vires. Relational injustice undermines any attempt to enlist
contract law’s enforcement services not because it conflicts with the parties’
presumed intent but rather because it is an abuse of the idea of contract; that
is, the use of contract law for a purpose that contravenes its telos.
An important subset of these justice-based rules regulates the parties’
bargaining process in a way that goes beyond the traditional laissez faire
mode of proscribing—in line with transfer theory—only the active interference of one party with the other’s free will. 39 This set of rules expands the
range of vitiating factors by prescribing affirmative interpersonal obligations.
It accounts for the expansion of the law of fraud beyond the traditional categories of misrepresentation and concealment to include also (notably in real
estate and securities transactions) disclosure duties. 40 This conceptual expansion also underlies the doctrine of unilateral mistakes. 41 Similar analysis may
help explain duress cases of wrongful threats that do not violate others’
rights as well as anti-price-gouging laws and admiralty rules of salvage. 42 Finally, a regime that is careful to ensure that contract is used only in settings
that comply with the minimal requirements of relational justice embraces
the unconscionability doctrine and some of its regulatory cognates, which
explicitly target cases of “gross inequality of bargaining power,” such as
where the weaker party suffers from “physical or mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy or inability to understand the language of the agreement.” 43
The floor of relational justice is more demanding than Benson’s account
of contractual fairness but is also not unique to contract. Quite the contrary,

36. See Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Justice for Contracts, SSRN (Mar. 1, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3435781 [https://perma.cc/SG3D-SHZJ],
on which the remainder of this Section relies.
37 . See, e .g ., Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the “Law of the
Poor,” 102 GEO. L.J. 1383 (2014).
38 . See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 36, at 34–52.
39 . See id . at 34–36.
40 . See id . at 42–47.
41 . See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
42 . See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 36, at 36–42.
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d; see also, e .g ., Dodd-Frank Act
§ 1031(d), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d).
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it is continuous with duties that other segments of private law, notably torts,
impose on people in similar settings. 44 The implied covenant of good faith in
performance goes beyond this floor. Benson, understandably, seeks to resist
this conventional understanding and thus offers a highly circumscribed interpretation of this doctrine, in which it expresses “at the highest level of abstraction the transactional conception of implication” (p. 157). Good faith’s
only task, in this view, is “to ensure that the expressly agreed-upon performances are construed and carried out in a way that the parties must reasonably have contemplated at contract formation” (pp. 157, 159). Thus
conceived, the doctrine of good faith requires courts to divine ex post the
presumed intent of the particular parties regarding the specific agreement at
hand. This is, however, a costly, error-prone factual inquiry, which tends to
destabilize contracts. 45 It frustrates parties’ ability to use contract as a planning device and might render good faith as an autonomy-reducing doctrine.
A genuinely liberal contract law does not subsume good-faith doctrine
under implication. Rather, it conceptualizes good faith as the umbrella for a
set of rules prescribing the heightened degree of interpersonal duties befitting the relationship of parties to an ongoing contract. Such duties are needed because contractual performance is typically sequential, which means that
contract generates the potential of opportunistic behavior and, therefore, of
heightened interpersonal vulnerability. This contract-specific type of relational injustice implies that law must go, as it does, beyond the mandatory
floor of relational justice. If contract law is to facilitate contracts proactively,
it must solidify a cooperative conception of contract performance.
This is the task of the various good-faith-based rules of the contractual
game, which serve as anti-opportunistic devices for specific moments in the
life of contracts in which one party is typically vulnerable (notably specification, termination, and renegotiation), as well as for specific contract types
(such as insurance) that characteristically “invite” such behavior. 46 Similar
analysis explains the substantial-performance doctrine in service contracts,
the principle against forfeiture in applying the condition/promise distinction, and the mitigation doctrine. 47
Admittedly, a liberal conception of contract should not force contractual
parties to attend to each other’s vulnerability more than they should attend
to the vulnerability of strangers. The parties may, for example, prefer to devise other, possibly better (for them), means to protect themselves from each
other’s opportunism. But because opportunism is anathema to contract’s
ability to facilitate planning across time, and thus to self-determination, a

44 . See Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships, supra note 18, at 1431–38, 1451–59; Avihay
Dorfman, Relational Justice and Torts, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE LAW THEORY,
supra note 4, at 321, 328–36.
45 . Cf . Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J.
926, 930 (2010).
46 . See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 36, at 56–63.
47 . See id . at 52–56, 63–68.
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liberal contract law cannot be indifferent to opportunism, either. Thus,
modern contract law appropriately includes this web of rules that prescribe
moderate cooperative duties as normative defaults. All these doctrines commit contractual parties to assist each other up to a point. Here, relational justice is not functioning as a floor; that is, as a prerequisite to law’s legitimate
use. Instead, relational justice works as an aspirational idea, one that informs
contract law’s normative defaults. Therefore, although these defaults are typically quite sticky, parties may generally opt out from many of these rules 48;
likewise, many specific obligations that are understood to derive from the
general duty of good faith are not strictly mandatory. 49
V.

SERVITUDE OR EXIT

Thus far I have compared Benson’s theory of contract and my competing autonomy-enhancing account on two fronts: their views as to the main
mission of contract law, and their respective conceptions of contractual justice. I turn now to the third and final comparative dimension, which deals
with the limits of contract. The most salient contemporary context that raises this question is the enforceability of (the proliferating) 50 employee noncompete agreements.
Faithful to transfer theory’s adherence to interpersonal independence,
Benson analyzes the limits of people’s power to commit through contract in
terms of “imposed servitude” (p. 202). Every “nonservile contractual relation” assumes that “parties retain control over their powers, productive or
otherwise, as constitutive of their personal and material independence even
while they carve out for transfer to each other circumscribed uses and crystallized products of those powers” (pp. 202–03). This means that contractual
terms cannot go beyond “the mere absorption of the party’s powers essential
to fulfilling her primary performance for which a quid pro quo has been
promised or given in return” (pp. 200–01). Because each “party’s independent powers”—namely, her “ability to control and use her productive powers
qua capital resource for other purposes and relations”—must remain inalienable, “even a scintilla of such transactionally unjustified imposition” is
deemed oppressive and thus void (pp. 201–03). In modern contract law, assessing the reasonableness of restrictive covenants against this test is the mission of the restraint-of-trade doctrine (pp. 200–03).
There is little reason to doubt this analysis insofar as it refers to selfenslavement contracts. But restrictive covenants are typically less imposing.
The characteristic noncompete purports to protect a business consumer base
or its distinctive know-how by limiting an employee’s future work in certain
48 . See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921).
49 . See Carma Devs. (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev. Cal., Inc., 826 P.2d 710, 728 (Cal.
1992); U.C.C. § 1-302(b) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
50. WHITE HOUSE, NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS OF THE USAGE, POTENTIAL
ISSUES, AND STATE RESPONSES 3 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default
/files/non-competes_report_final2.pdf [https://perma.cc/LXW2-DY6C].
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positions for a circumscribed duration and in a given geographic area. 51 Unfortunately, regarding these garden-variety restraints, Benson’s instructions
are, at least on their face, quite ambiguous.
Thus, if our Hohfeldian power to commit, as per transfer theory, can
only be limited when we purport to alienate the “freedom to engage in productive and market activities” (p. 203), then most, if not all, of these noncompetes would be valid. If, by contrast, the point is to carefully
circumscribe our ability to alienate any fraction of our independence so that
it is strictly limited to the “primary performance” of the contract, many of
these ancillary obligations, as well as quite a few others, would be invalid
even where their imposition on our future self is relatively marginal. Echoing
the doctrinal language, Benson frames the inquiry in terms of reasonableness
(pp. 464–65). But it is unclear how reasonableness figures in either of these
questions. When independence is the ultimate currency, neither weight nor
effects seems relevant. 52
Benson’s brief as to the significance of independence provides, however,
a promising starting point for breaking this impasse. As accountable agents,
he explains, we must preserve the “standpoint of sheer negative independence from everything immediately presented by [our] needs, desires, circumstances, and the like,” so that we can “distinguish and distance ourselves
from what we happen to desire or need and from the situation in which we
find ourselves” (p. 370). This seems to be a correct, indeed an important,
proposition; but it is also significantly incomplete. Accountable agency does
not, indeed cannot, imply a permanent state of distinction between our
selves and who we actually are; namely, our higher-order projects and constitutive circumstances as well as the more concrete plans and interests we
currently have. What it suggests instead is that we should be able to make
this distinction, to distance ourselves from the standpoint of who we are and
critically examine all these features. 53
This means that, pace Benson, while people’s “moral power of asserting
their sheer independence vis-à-vis everything particular and given” is indeed
crucial, it need not be understood as “higher-order” or “conceptually more
basic” than their self-determination (pp. 389–90, 473). Self-determination,
not independence, is of ultimate value. But this does not derogate independence to the status of sheer instrument. Independence is an intrinsic value,
constitutive of our self-determination. This is why, as noted, only modest affirmative duties are acceptable in private law. 54 This is also why, more to the
point here, people’s right to self-determination does not rely on a conception
of self-authorship in which one constructs a “narrative arc” for one’s life in

51 . See, e .g ., Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor
Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 536, 595 (2018).
52 . See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE WRONGS, at xi–xii, 37–38 (2016).
53 . Cf . HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 69 (2011) (discussing
the significance of having a critical perspective on one’s constitutive communities).
54 . See supra text accompanying notes 17–19.

April 2021]

Two Visions of Contract

1265

advance. Rather, self-determination allows, indeed requires, opportunities
for people to take a critical perspective on any part of their identity and thus
to change and vary their plans. As agents, our life story must be neither a set
of unrelated episodes nor a script fully written in advance. Selfdetermination puts a high value on people’s right to “reinvent themselves.” 55
Our autonomy requires the ability to both write and rewrite our life story
and start afresh. 56
This is exactly the focus of the way an autonomy-enhancing view of contract conceptualizes the limits of contract. Once we realize that the power to
revise or even discard (exit) one’s plans is an entailment of contract’s own
normative underpinnings, it becomes clear that liberal contract law must appreciate not only the significance of enabling people to make credible commitments but also the impediment these commitments pose to their ability
to rewrite their life story. Liberal contract law, in other words, should safeguard the self-determination of people’s future selves. Because any act of
self-determination constrains the future self, 57 this tension—which requires
limiting the range, and at times the types, of enforceable commitments people can undertake—is inherent in contract’s raison d’être. In fact, it encapsulates the real challenge of liberal contract law. There is no easy formula for
resolving this difficulty, which may explain the reasonableness inquiry of restraint-of-trade doctrine.
This commitment to the self-determination of our future self is manifested in other segments of contract law as well. 58 One example, dealing with
the common law’s resilient reluctance towards specific performance, should
suffice here. 59
In the common law, as Benson indicates, “where an award of money can
fully and completely compensate the plaintiff for impairment of her contractual interest in performance, the damage remedy is adequate and specific
performance is ordinarily refused” (p. 266). Transfer theory seems to entail

55. DAGAN, supra note 11, at 43.
56 . See id .
57. As this Review hopefully clarifies, the concern for the future self does not imply an
endorsement of the idea of multiple selves; namely, the disintegration of the self. Quite the
contrary, choice theory rejects, rather than subscribes to, this position; indeed, its core claim
regarding the significance of planning to self-determination implies that the current self and
the future self are the same self. The integrity of the self, rather than its separation into different selves, is what drives choice theory’s justification for contract enforcement, and is thus a
necessary feature of its account of the telos of contract. The discussion of the future self is thus
a discussion of the self in the future and the liberal prescription to enable its ability to rewrite
its course.
58 . See Dagan & Heller, supra note 4; Hanoch Dagan & Ohad Somech, When Contract’s
Basic Assumptions Fail, 34 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. (forthcoming 2021) (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
59. The following discussion heavily draws on Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, Specific
Performance, SSRN (Sept. 2, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3647336 [https://perma.cc
/2WLQ-6S4J], where Heller and I also explain why the common law’s justified preference for
damages should be treated as a normative default (except when workers are in breach).
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the opposite position, applied by civil law jurisdictions, in which specific
performance is the presumptive contract remedy, 60 but Benson nonetheless
defends the common law rule. Just like specific performance, such a pecuniary remedy, he claims, protects the promisee’s “baseline entitlement” of
“having actual possession of the subject matter of the contractually contemplated performance,” because it puts her “in the same position in all material
respects as she would have been if she obtained performance in specie”
(pp. 267–69). Nothing beyond that is required or can be justified, Benson argues, since “neither party can affect or make an impact on the other’s freedom of action or assets via contract remedies except insofar as this is strictly
necessary to protect his or her rightful performance interest” (p. 271).
This argument, however, is too fast, because even where a monetary
award is materially equivalent to specific performance, its power depends on
identifying exactly “the contractually contemplated performance,” namely,
deciding whether it is the good or service at issue or rather its material value.
I am not claiming that full equivalence, which indeed makes specific performance unwarranted, can be only inferred from an explicit reservation. Rather, my point is that transfer theory, as Benson articulates it, must invite
judges to engage in implication; that is, to follow the presumed intent of the
particular parties of the actual transaction. Therefore, transfer theory cannot
explain, and does not justify, privileging damages in all these cases, let alone
making such monetary recovery the only available remedy.
This critique should not indict the persistent position of the common
law. Quite the contrary: notwithstanding its recent criticism as normatively
embarrassing, 61 the common law rule properly vindicates contract’s autonomy-enhancing commitments. To see why, recall that for choice theory the
legitimacy of authorizing promisees to insist on enforcement and recruit the
coercive power of the state for backing up their authority is grounded on
contract’s service to people’s ability to plan. 62 This means that contract’s impingement upon the self-determination of the future self can be justified only because and to the extent that the claimed dominion of the present self
over its future self can be justified.
The common law baseline in which by and large breach of contract triggers compensation, rather than specific performance, serves as a stronghold
for the autonomy of promisors’ future selves. Compelling the promisor to
act in accordance with the contractual script is qualitatively more imposing
on her self-determination than requiring her to cover the promisee’s expec-

60. For this position, see Robert Stevens, Contract, Rights and the Morality of Promising
(2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (reviewing DAGAN &
HELLER, supra note 4).
61 . See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 708 (2007).
62 . See supra text accompanying notes 16–20.
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tation. 63 In certain contract types specific performance is, to be sure, the only
viable way of facilitating contract’s functioning as a planning tool, and in
these cases, such a remedy is indeed readily available. 64 But in many other
contract types, contract’s mission of planning facilitation is not significantly
affected by the liquidation of the promise into money. In these cases, when
other things are equal, or close to being equal, for the promisee, 65 liberal contract law, which properly attends not only to the autonomy of the parties at
formation but also to that of their future selves, rightly opts for allowing
promisors to choose between performance and damages.
CONCLUSION
Competing contract theories, like legal theories of other fields, are
judged, as Benson suggests, according to both their ability to justify the legal
practice at hand and their fit to its main doctrines and principles. Elsewhere,
I’ve challenged transfer theory’s justificatory premise. 66 My focus in this Review is different. Transfer theory, I’ve argued, offers either partial or unsatisfactory answers to many of the specific questions contract law must resolve.
Contract, I’ve claimed, should not be understood as a transfer of exclusive
control over a determinate object, and contract law need not settle with the
protection of our interpersonal independence. Rather, as a joint undertaking
of a cooperative arrangement, contract is a planning device that enhances
people’s autonomy. Contract law plays a crucial role in both proactively facilitating contracts and ensuring their integrity by securing their compliance
with relational justice. Contract’s reliance on people’s obligation of reciprocal respect for self-determination implies that the modest affirmative duties
of modern contract law do not threaten its legitimacy. The real challenge of
liberal contract law lies elsewhere: in taking seriously its mission of empowering our current self while safeguarding the right of our future self to rewrite the story of our life.

63 . Cf . Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships, supra note 18, at 1455 (discussing the imposition of legal duties in noncontractual contexts and its effect on individual autonomy).
64 . See, e .g ., STEPHEN A. SMITH, RIGHTS, WRONGS, AND INJUSTICES: THE STRUCTURE OF
REMEDIAL LAW 163 (2019) (indicating that the main exception to the common law baseline
rule of no specific performance involves sales of unique goods or land).
65. Recall that the position of the common law is that specific performance will not be
ordered only if “damages would be adequate to protect the expectation interest of the injured
party.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981).
66 . See supra note 11.
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